


TOP SECRET

25X1




22 Sept. 62

25X1

Copy No. C

5-16

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

22 September 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Argentina: (*Page i*)

25X1

3. Cuba: Increased Soviet influence may benefit old-line Communists. (*Page iii*)

4. Sino-Indian Border: Latest northeast frontier clash results in casualties for both sides. (*Page iv*)

5. Laos: Coup rumors continue in Vientiane. (*Page v*)

6. Thailand: Sarit government plans stronger opposition to US Southeast Asia policy. (*Page vi*)

7. Indonesia: Sukarno may reorganize his cabinet soon. (*Page vii*)

25X1

10. British Guiana: London conference on Guiana's independence hinges on constitutional provisions. (*Page x*)

(Continued)

25X1

22 September 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS
(Continued)

11. Venezuela: Army may overthrow Betancourt
before the end of September. (*Page xi*)

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 September 1962

DAILY BRIEF

*Argentina: (Information as of 0415 EDT) President Guido reportedly resigned early today under pressure from "hard-line" anti-Peronist army and navy elements and a military junta appears to be on the verge of taking over the Argentine government. An early morning announcement by the navy ministry indicated that officers of both factions engaged in the four-day-old struggle would be called into council "to reorganize the government."

Yesterday's short-lived "victory" of the Campo de Mayo rebels was followed by a renewal of hostilities when "hard-line" Generals Lorio and Labayru refused to accept their dismissal by President Guido. Air force participation in the struggle on the side of the Campo de Mayo rebels apparently provoked the navy into lining up on the side of the "hard-line" elements. It is not yet clear whether all forces involved in the struggle have heeded the navy's peacemaking overtures. The only certainty is that Argentina is closer to a military dictatorship than it has been since the overthrow of Frondizi.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

Cuba: [Fidel Castro and his "new Communists" still hold dominant positions in the regime's party and governmental machinery, but their power relative to that of the veteran Cuban Communists may be diminishing.]

[] signs of the resurgence of old-line Communists, especially Blas Roca, have become pronounced in recent weeks. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[] part of the price the Cubans were forced to pay for the recent Soviet military deliveries was the yielding of a greater political and policy-making role to the "people in whom Soviet leaders have confidence in Cuba," i. e., the veteran Communists. [] Soviet Ambassador Alekseyev is in frequent contact with and works closely with old-line Cuban Communists.]

25X1

25X1

[Since last March, when Castro stemmed the veteran Communist drive for domination and purged old Communist Anibal Escalante, the old Communists have appeared to be adjusting to a role subordinate to Castro's leadership. Recently, however, Castro's dependence on the Soviet Union has greatly increased, and this may in time put him at a disadvantage in asserting his will over the old Communists, whom Moscow probably finds more reliable than Castro.]



25X1

22 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

iii

COMMUNIST CHINA-INDIA BORDER AREA



Sino-Indian Border: The clash which occurred in the northeast frontier area on 20-21 September has resulted in casualties on both sides, including the first admitted Chinese fatality of the year. Each side immediately issued strong protests and Peiping warned that the situation has "reached a most critical point and the flames of war may flare up" in the area.

The clash was probably the result of the Indian effort to expel Chinese troops which New Delhi alleges intruded south of the McMahon line last week.

The incident will set back prospects for an early initiation of talks. In an exchange of notes just before the clash both Peiping and New Delhi had reiterated their proposals for border talks and had announced willingness in principle to meet on 15 October. Differences on the scope and substance of the proposed talks, however, have not yet been resolved.

25X1

25X1

Laos: [Rumors of coup plotting continue to circulate in Vientiane. According to the most recent rumor, General Phoumi plans a coup on 9 October after the US Military Assistance Advisory Group completes its withdrawal.]

25X1

[Although these rumors are not supported by other evidence, it is clear that Phoumi and the right-wingers are becoming increasingly disturbed over indications that North Vietnamese troops are preparing to remain in Laos.]

[On 10 September, Phoumi told a group of his military supporters that if the "foreign troops"--presumably North Vietnamese--are not evacuated by the end of the withdrawal period on 7 October there would "certainly" be a resumption of hostilities.]

25X1

22 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

Thailand: [Prime Minister Sarit apparently fears for his position if he does not show stronger opposition to US policy in Southeast Asia.]

[Confidence in his leadership of the military oligarchy has been shaken by a series of setbacks to Thai prestige following Sarit's endorsement of US policy in Laos against the advice of subordinates. The International Court decision awarding a disputed border temple to Cambodia and increased American military aid to Cambodia have figured largely in this context.]

25X1

[] the proposed Thai-Soviet trade agreement is only the first step to free Thailand from its dependence upon the United States.]

25X1

[] Thai officials have agreed to ask for withdrawal of American troops from Thailand if Foreign Minister Thanat fails to obtain a modification of US policy toward Cambodia during his present visit to the UN General Assembly.]

25X1

Indonesia: [Sukarno is proposing to make certain changes in the Indonesian cabinet in the near future.]

[The most significant change would be the elevation of Foreign Minister Subandrio to the post of First Minister, replacing Djuanda, who has been relatively inactive because of illness. This appointment would be a further indication that Sukarno is seeking to reduce the currently strong political role of the military in keeping with his long-standing policy of balancing opposing elements in order to assure his own continuation in power. Subandrio has opposed the army's participation in politics in recent years, whereas Djuanda has tended to support the military.]

[The changes would have no immediate effect on Indonesia's policies, but reduction of the army's political role could lead to increased Communist influence in the government.]

[It is not clear at present whether or not Subandrio will retain his Foreign Ministry portfolio after assuming the First Minister post. If he does not, the most likely successor to the Foreign Ministry is Ambassador to Moscow Malik, who has not been involved in internal political maneuvers.]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

British Guiana: [Now scheduled for 23 October after two postponements, the London conference to set a date for British Guiana's independence will hinge on constitutional provisions on which the differences are so great that the conference may founder.]

[The Jagan party and the leading opposition party have threatened to walk out of the conference unless their respective proposals for the electoral system are agreed upon. Jagan insists upon retaining the present system of election by plurality, while the opposition parties are equally determined to install proportional representation. Disagreement is also bitter over Jagan's proposal to lower the voting age to 18.]

25X1

22 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

x

25X1

Venezuela: A group of military officers

25X1

reportedly is plotting to overthrow President Romulo Betancourt before the end of September. Their objective is said to be "to put an end to Communist terrorist activities in the country."

Last month these military leaders demanded that President Betancourt take various steps to inhibit the activities of Communists and other leftists. One of their demands was that he remove the congressional immunity of two deputies charged with complicity in the leftist revolt of last June.

President Betancourt and other government officials have been aware of the plot for at least a week, but do not appear greatly concerned and have not taken any extraordinary security measures to prevent it.

25X1

22 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

xi

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9

TOP SECRET